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NOTES
WHEN IS A FOREIGN CAUSE OF ACTION BARRED
BY LIMITATIONS IN MISSOURI?
Since the decision of the cases of Christner v. Chi., R. I. & P.
Ry. Co. by the Kansas City Court of Appeals1 and Wright v.
New York Underwriters Insurance Co. by Judge Reeves of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Mis-
souri2 the question of when a foreign cause of action is barred
by limitations in Missouri has become a live one.
The first declaration of the law of limitations applicable to
foreign causes of action which were sued on in Missouri was
made in 1841. The rule was then stated to be that it was no
defense to show that under the law of the place in which the
cause of action arose the remedy thereon had been barred by
lapse of time.3 The counterpart of the rule was declared in 1865
to be that it was a good defense to an action in Missouri on a
foreign cause of action to show that, because of the lapse of time,
the right of the plaintiff had been extinguished by the law of
the place where the cause of action arose.4 The final refinement
of the rule was reached in 1870 when it was held that unless the
law of the place where the cause of action arose expressly ex-
tinguished the right of the plaintiff because of lapse of time with
no action having been brought thereon, the laws of Missouri
relating to limitations of actions would be applied in every case.5
The rule was justified on two grounds, first, that so long as the
right of the plaintiff continued to be alive it was of no conse-
quence that the laws of Missouri allowed him more time in which
to force the defendant to do his duty than the laws of the place
where the cause of action arose and, second, that the limitation
laws of the place where the cause of action arose could have no
extraterritorial effect.
The distinction made by the Missouri courts between limita-
tion laws which merely bar a remedy and those which extinguish
the right is of no consequence at the present time. It is sub-
mitted that in any event it would seem to be a distinction without
a difference, as a practical matter, to say that the abolition of
the remedy whereby a right may be enforced is not also an
abolition of the right. It would seem that a right without a
remedy is exactly equal in amount to Shakespeare's two grains
of wheat.6
In 1855 the Missouri legislature added a new element to the
1 (1933) 228 Mo. App. 220, 64 S. W. (2nd) 752.
2 (1933) 1 Fed. Supp. 663.
a King v. Lane (1841) 7 Mo. 241.
4 Baker v. Stonebraker (1865) 36 Mo. 338.
5 Carson v. Hunter (1870) 46 Mo. 467.
6 Merchant of Venice.
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limitation laws of the state by providing that "If any action
shall have been commenced within the times respectively pre-
scribed in the preceeding articles, and the plaintiff therein suffer
a non-suit, or after verdict for him, the judgment be arrested,
or after judgment for him, the same be reversed on appeal or
error such plaintiff may commence a new action from time to
time, within one year after such non-suit suffered or judgment
arrested or reversed . . ."7 This section has continued to be a
part of the statutory law of Missouri from the time of its en-
actment until the present. It appears as R. S. Mo. 1929, §874
in the same words as quoted above except that as R. S. Mo. 1929,
§874 it is worded "If any action shall have been commenced
within the times respectively prescribed in articles 8 and 9 of
this chapter . . ." This statute has been construed to be a saving
clause and not to have provided additional limitations on the
right of a plaintiff to sue. Thus it is held that R. S. Mo. 1929,
§874 applies only to save the new action provided for in it from
the bar of the statutes of limitations that would otherwise be
applicable at the time of the non-suit, arrest of judgment or re-
versal of judgment.3
For the sake of clarity it is well at this point to summarize
the law of limitations applicable to foreign causes of action as
it existed in Missouri in 1899. It was as follows: If the law of
the place where the cause of action arose did not expressly
provide that the lapse of a certain length of time without suit
having been brought would extinguish plaintiff's right, then the
time within which the action could be maintained in Missouri
depended on the law of Missouri relating to limitations of actions.
If, having the right to do so, a person brought suit in Missouri
on a foreign cause of action and, after such an action had been
barred by the Missouri limitation laws,; such person suffered a
non-suit, arrest of judgment, or reversal of judgment therein,
then, because of what is now R. S. Mo. 1929, §874, he could
bring a new action within a year from the date of the non-suit,
arrest or reversal of judgment.
In 1899 the Missouri legislature passed a statute relating ex-
pressly to limitations applicable to foreign causes of action which
were sued on in Missouri. This entire enactment is here set out
in order that its intended effect may be more clearly observed.
This section provided as follows:
"LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS: PERSONAL ACTIONS
"An Act to amend chapter 103 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri 1899, entitled 'Limitations of Actions' by adding a
7Laws of Missouri (1855) Ch. 103, Article 3, Section 3, page 1051.
8 Billion v. Walsh (1870) 46 Mo. 492.
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new section thereto, to be known as section 6779a, and relating
to limitations of actions when barred by the laws of the states,
territory or country in which it originated and defense thereto.
"Section 1. When bar to action is complete defense. Be it
enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri as
follows:
"(Section 1) §6779a. Whenever a cause of action has been
fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in
which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any
action thereon in any of the courts of this state."9
This section has continued to be a part of the statutory law
of Missouri from the date of its enactment to the present day.
It appears as R. S. Mo. 1929, §869. It is the final declaration of
the legislature with regard to limitations applicable to foreign
causes of action which are sued on in Missouri.
It is in attempting to decide what effect this statute had that
the modern difficulty in determining when a foreign cause of
action is barred by limitations in Missouri has been occasioned.
The question of whether a cause of action is barred by limita-
tions arises only at the time of the institution of a suit thereon.
In considering when a foreign cause of action is barred by limita-
tions in Missouri it is well to consider the question presented at
the time of the institution of the original action on a foreign
cause of action separately from the question which is presented
at the time of the institution of successive actions on the same
cause of action.
At the time of the institution of the original action in Missouri
on a foreign cause of action the question becomes, by what law
is the right of the plaintiff to maintain such action to be gov-
erned? As was pointed out herein prior to the enactment of
what is now R. S. Mo. 1929, §869, if the law of the place had
not, due to lapse of time, extinguished the right of the plaintiff,
then the law of Missouri relating to limitations of actions con-
trolled. Since the passage of what is now R. S. Mo. 1929, §869,
the Missouri courts hold that the time limited by the law of the
place where the cause of action arose is the law which governs
the right of the plaintiff to maintain his action in Missouri.10
It must be here noted that §869 does not provide, except indi-
rectly, the time within which foreign causes of actions must be
sued on in Missouri. By providing that "whenever a cause of
action shall have been fully barred by the laws of the place in
9 Laws of Missouri (1899) page 300.
10 Theis v. Wood (1911) 238 Mo. 643, 142 S. W. 431; Thompson v. Lyons
(1920) 281 Mo. 430, 220 S. W. 942; St. Joe & G. I. Ry. Co. v. Ellenwood
Grain Co. (1918) 199 Mo. App. 432, 203 S. W. 680; Deal v. St. L. & S. F.
Ry. Co. (1914) 176 Mo. App. 8, 162 S. W. 760.
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which it originated said bar shall be a complete defenseoa to any
action thereon in any of the courts of Missouri," the legislature
thereby implied the rule which is now announced by the courts
as above stated. For the purposes of this article the rule may
well be worded as follows: Foreign causes of action must be sued
on in Missouri within the same time as would be required if
suit were to be brought thereon in the state in which they origi-
nated. It will be observed that R. S. Mo. 1929, §869 had the
effect of abolishing the distinction between limitation laws of the
place wherein the cause of action arose which extinguished the
right and those which merely extinguished the remedy and made
foreign causes of action subject to the same limitations in Mis-
souri to which they were subject in the state of their origin.
To the rule that the time within which suit must be brought
in Missouri on foreign causes of action is governed by the limita-
tion laws of the state in which it originated, there has been
added a qualification. In cases where the law of the place in
which the cause of action originated allows more time for the
institution of a particular class of litigation than is allowed
therefor by the laws of Missouri, the courts of Missouri hold that
the law applicable is the law of Missouri. The reasons given for
this qualification of the general rule is that R. S. Mo. 1929,
§869 was intended as a further limitation on suits in Missouri
on foreign causes of action 1' and was not intended to relieve a
suitor from the operation of the laws of Missouri.
Supposing that an original action was filed within the time
allowed therefor by the foregoing rules, and subsequently, after
the expiration of the time limited for the filing of such a suit, the
plaintiff therein suffered a non-suit, arrest of judgment or re-
versal of judgment. His right to bring another action on the
same cause of action is to be determined under the law as it
existed prior to the enactment of R. S. Mo. 1929, §869 which,
as heretofore explained, was governed by the law of Missouri,
and thus by R. S. Mo. 1929, §874. Since the enactment of R. S.
Mo. (1929) §869 the rule has been changed. The first case dealing
with the question after the passage of §869 was the case of
McCoy v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. in which the Kansas City Court of
Appeals per Judge Ellison held that the right of a plaintiff to
commence a new action in Missouri on a foreign cause of action,
after suffering a non-suit in a prior suit which was timely
brought, was to be determined by the law of the place where
the cause of action originated, and if, according to that law, the
plaintiff 'did not have the right to commence a new action, he
104 Italics supplied.
11 Farthing v. Sams (1922) 296 Mo. 442, 247 S. W. 111.
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did not, because of R. S. Mo. 1929, §869, have the right to do
so in Missouri.12
The rule stated by Judge Ellison was followed by the Missouri
Supreme Court in the case of Handlin v. Burchett'3 which is
now the last controlling decision of the Supreme court, and is
thus the law of Missouri at the present time.
This construction of R. S. Mo. 1929, §869 is in accord with
the obvious intent of the legislature. By its express wording it
applies whenever a cause of action originating in a foreign state
has been fully barred by the laws of that state and applies to
any action on the foreign cause of action. The law applicable in
all cases of suits in Missouri on foreign causes of action prior to
its enactment was, as herein shown, that of Missouri; and after
non-suit, arrest of judgment, or reversal, of a prior action which
had been timely brought, but which, at the time of the non-suit,
etc., was barred by the law of Missouri, a new action was allowed
by R. S. Mo. 1929, §874. Being fully cognizant of the law as
it then existed, it is a fair inference that the legislature intended
to negative any effect which §874 may have had in such a case
by making §869 applicable to any action on a foreign cause when-
ever it was fully barred by the law of the foreign state.
The question of which law governs the right of a plaintiff to
commence a new suit in Missouri on a foreign cause of action
after having suffered a non-suit in a prior action which had
been timely brought thereon, was presented to Judge Reeves of
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri. 14 Saying that the rule of the McCoy case 4a did not
seem tenable to him, he held that when an original action was
commenced in Missouri on a foreign cause of action within the
time allowed therefor by the law of the state in which it origi-
nated, then §869 was satisfied, and if subsequently the plaintiff
therein suffered a non-suit, his right to commence a new suit on
the same cause of action in Missouri was governed by R. S. Mo.
1929, §874. In making this ruling the learned Judge fell into
grievous error. His ruling does not accord with the obvious in-
tent of R. S. Mo. 1929, §869 because it restricts the application
of the statute to the original action in Missouri on a foreign
cause of action when the statute expressly applies whenever a
cause of action which originates in another state has been fully
barred by the laws of the state etc., wherein it originated, said
bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon etc. Further,
12 (1909) 134 Mo. App. 622, 114 S. W. 1124.
13 (1917) 270 Mo. 114, 192 S. W. 1016.
14 Wright v. New York Underwriters Insurance Co. (1932) 1 Fed. Supp.
663.
141 Supra, note 12.
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it has long been held by the Federal courts that in the construc-
tion of state statutes, the Federal courts will follow the con-
struction placed thereon by the courts of the particular state.15
In refusing to follow the McCoy case, and in failing to follow
Handlin v. Burchett Judge Reeves did not do his duty as required
by the Conformity Act. Hence, this opinion cannot be regarded
as good law in Missouri.
Following the example set by Judge Reeves, the Kansas City
Court of Appeals in a case which appeared to them to involve
the question of the right of a plaintiff to bring new action in
Missouri on a foreign cause of action after having suffered a
non-suit in a prior suit thereon in Missouri, decided, in an
opinion written by Judge Bland, that the law of Missouri was
the law which determined the plaintiff's right.10 If this opinion
were not wholly dictum it would be subject to the same criticism
as that of Judge Reeves, in that such a holding fails to give full
effect to the provisions of R. S. Mo. (1929) §869, and thus
negatives a part of said statute, and also seeks to overrule the
Supreme Court in the case of Handlin v. Burchett which, it is
submitted, the Kansas City Court of Appeals is without authority
to do. The opinion of Judge Bland is wholly dictum for the
reason that the cause of action sued on in the particular case
was a tort claim for personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff in
Kansas. The Kansas statutes barred such actions within two
years after they arose. More than two years after the cause of
action arose plaintiff filed the original action in Missouri and
thereafter voluntarily dismissed it. Within a year after such
dismissal a new suit was commenced on the same course of action
which suit was prosecuted to judgment for the plaintiff. De-
fendant contended that the action was barred by R. S. Mo. 1929,
§869. In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the learnedjudge held that since in the prior action the plaintiff had suffered
a non-suit under R. S. Mo. 1929, §874, she had another year
within which to bring the present suit, and since this had been
done the action was not barred. Without going into detail, it
appears from the facts that the original action brought by the
plaintiff was, at the time it was commenced, barred by the two
year statute of Kansas and thus under R. S. Mo. 1929, §869
it was also barred in Missouri. This being so, the action was not
commenced within the time allowed by the Missouri statute.
R. S. Mo. 1929, §874 provides expressly "If any action shall
have been commenced within the times respectively prescribed
15 Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Michigan Ry. Comm. (1916) 236 U. S.
615; Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Omaha (1913) 230 U. S. 100.
16 Christner v. Chi. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1933) 228 Mo. App. 220, 64
S. W. (2nd) 757.
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in articles 8 and 9 of this chapter and the plaintiff therein suffer
a non-suit etc." R. S. Mo. 1929, §869 is one of the sections in
Article 9 referred to R. S. Mo. 1929, §874. Thus, since the orig-
inal action was not brought within the time allowed therefor in
article 9, §874, had nothing to apply to, and hence any remarks
concerning its effects are purely dicta.
There being no other deviations from the rule as declared by
the Missouri Supreme Court in Handlin v. Burchett it stands as
the law of Missouri today, the rule being that whenever, under
the law of the place where the cause of action arose, further
action thereon is barred, the same bar is a complete defense to
any action thereon in the courts of Missouri.
J. H. HALEY '26.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS WITH RECENT MISSOURI
DEVELOPMENTS
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted into law
in Missouri on June 22, 1935,1 thus becoming the sixth Uniform
Act to be adopted in Missouri: the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the Warehouse Receipts Act, the Reciprocal Transfer Act, the
Veterans Guardianship Act, and the Federal Tax Lien Registra-
tion Act having been adopted previously. Four of the six acts
have been adopted within the last six years. The widespread
interest which has been manifested in the Declaratory Judgment
Act by legal scholars and by state legislatures merits its dis-
cussion.
Historically, the underlying theory of declaratory actions dates
back to the time of Moses.2 From the Bible we learn that
Zelophehad, a noble Israelite, died and left five daughters. In-
dignant over the possibility of having the property pass from the
family's control because the father left no male heir to succeed
to the heirloom, the daughters insisted upon claiming the right
to inherit the estate. The petition was pointed! It simply put
to the court the question, "Why should the name of our father
be done away from among his family, because he hath no son?"
'Laws of Mo. 1935 p. 218. The wording of section 1 of the Missouri law
has substituted the wording, "The Circuit Courts and the Courts of Com-
mon Pleas of this state, within their respective jurisdictions, etc." for the
phrase, "Courts of record within, etc." contained in the Uniform Act. Sec-
tions 16 & 17 were omitted as being unnecessary and Section 15 was ra-
worded to read, "All laws or parts of law in conflict with the provisions
of this act are hereby repealed in so far as such laws are in conflict with
provisions of this tet."
2 Clark, And Zelophehad Had Daughters, 10 A. B. A. Journal 133 (1924).
3 Numbers, 27: 4.
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